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This article has been developed from a paper originally 
prepared for the 2013 Salzburg Workshop on Cyber 
Investigations under the supervision of Professors 
Laurel E. Fletcher, Chris Hoofnagle, Eric Stover, and 
Jennifer Urban. 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to assist the Office of the 
Prosecutor (“OTP”) at the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”) by discussing cyber investigation 
protocols that enable the strategic mobilization and 
acquisition of digital evidence. 
This paper discusses cyber investigation protocols 
relevant to three types of digital evidence: data that 
is stored on a physical device; data that is not stored 
on a device that an investigator is able to have 
physical access to or is accessible online; and data 
that is stored in servers and held privately by a 
service provider. The first section addresses how an 
investigator might acquire and authenticate physical 
devices that may have evidentiary value. The 
protocols demonstrate methods that reduce the risk 
of inadmissibility and manipulation. The second 
section addresses situations where the investigator 
obtains evidence from a device other than the 
original, for instance, a video that is posted on a 
publicly available website, and is available as a 
download from a server. Since this type of digital 
evidence is not forensically acquired, this section 
aims to illustrate how investigators can determine its 
reliability. Additionally, this section explains how 
prosecutors might authenticate such evidence by 
corroboration or testimony. The third section turns 
to data held by service providers that is not available 
without their cooperation. This data may be acquired 
by a direct request from a prosecutor. For United 
States service providers, the U.S. Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”) sets forth procedures 
for domestic law enforcement access to this data. It 
is silent on foreign law enforcement access. The 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLAT”) process 
addresses foreign law enforcement access to this 
data; however, this process is lengthy and may be 
subject to other legal requirements, such as dual 
criminality. Please note that protocols in all three 
sections are based on standards that reflect the 
current technological landscape and therefore 
should be updated when necessary. Furthermore, 
the basic procedures discussed here are derived from 
lengthy treatments of forensic analysis in source 
documents. In all three types of investigations, 
situational factors arise in which deviation from the 
protocols discussed is appropriate. Therefore, each 
investigation will need to employ specific procedures 
that are dependent on the context. 
Introduction 
Cyber investigation protocols help investigators 
gather digital evidence in a forensically valid way. This 
paper presents the existing landscape, presents 
challenges and opportunities, as well as provides a 
framework to aid prosecutors in establishing greater 
integrity of digital evidence in cyber investigations. 
Digital evidence is “data that is created, manipulated, 
stored or communicated by any device, computer or 
computer system or transmitted over a 
communication system, that is relevant to the 
proceeding.”1 For purposes of this paper, digital 
evidence is divided into three categories. The first 
category includes data that an investigator acquires 
from a physical device such as a hard drive or wireless 
telephone. The second category includes data stored 
on a server, and accessible from an online service via 
a computer or smartphone. For example, a video that 
is stored in a publicly available online service, such as 
YouTube, or evidence sent by e-mail to an investigator 
from the scene of a crime fall within the second 
category. The third category includes evidentiary data 
held by a service provider, and not otherwise 
                                                          
1 Stephen Mason, editor, International Electronic Evidence (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008); for other 
definitions, see Burkhard Schaffer and Stephen Mason, ‘The 
characteristics of electronic evidence in digital format’ Chapter 2, 27 
in Stephen Mason, gen ed, Electronic Evidence (3rd edn, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2012) and George L. Paul, Foundations of Digital 
Evidence (American Bar Association, 2008), 23-24. 
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available. E-mail messages held by a service such as 
Gmail or Yahoo! Mail and photographs held in a cloud 
storage service such as Dropbox are each examples of 
this category of data. 
The protocols illustrate digital evidence practices 
employed by investigators throughout the 
international community; however, this paper does 
not claim to set out minimum standards required to 
gather evidence or to offer precise procedures for 
how the ICC will evaluate different forms of digital 
evidence. Individual investigations are context and 
fact-specific, thus they may be affected by limitations 
on resources as well as unique factors that affect the 
particular situation an investigator may find 
themselves in. The purpose of this paper was to set 
out the basic procedures in order to provide some 
foundational information to aid the workshop 
discussion in Salzburg and the ICC’s efforts in further 
developing its cyber investigation practices. Finally, 
the entirety of relevant investigative practices cannot 
be summarized in a treatment of this length. 
Evidentiary protocols for devices in the 
possession of investigators 
This section addresses situations for investigators who 
encounter or directly obtain a physical device, such as 
a hard drive, that may have evidentiary value. The 
handling of the device can affect the admissibility of 
the evidence extracted from the device and its 
probative value. A consideration of the protocols 
described below will enhance the veracity of the 
evidence. 
These protocols are a compilation of the U.S. 
Department of Justice2 and the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (“ACPO”) Good Practice Guide for 
Digital Evidence.3 These guidelines were chosen 
because they are based upon current technologies 
and are referenced throughout the cyber investigation 
community; however, the guidelines should be 
updated as new technologies emerge. 
Acquisition  
                                                          
2 US Department of Justice, Forensic Examination of Digital 
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, (April 2004), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199408.pdf . 
3 Association of Chief Police Officers, Good Practice Guide for 




To maximize the integrity of an investigation, the 
investigator should identify the device, determine its 
setup, and make a forensic copy of the data. 
Investigators should document their actions by 
keeping a log that describes persons who handled the 
evidence, actions taken which could potentially alter 
the evidence, and the physical storage of the evidence 
from the point of discovery to its introduction. 
Capturing the entire process on video4 is highly 
recommended.5 Thorough documentation of the 
acquisition process will aid in establishing the chain of 
custody and the overall credibility of the evidence. 
Furthermore, the documentation log should include a 
diagram or a photograph depicting the device’s setup, 
including all the cables and ports, so it may be 
reassembled if necessary. If disassembling the device 
for relocation, all items should have signed exhibit 
labels attached. Failure to do so may create difficulties 
with the chain of custody, leading to challenges by the 
defense. Additionally, it is common for individuals to 
keep their passwords in written form and in close 
proximity to their computer; therefore investigators 
should search surrounding areas and document all 
potentially valuable pieces of evidence. Upon 
discovery,6 the investigator should determine whether 
the device is likely to hold evidence. Furthermore, the 
investigator should consider removing the device 
from any network due to the possibility that the 
owner might be able to obtain access to it remotely.7 
However, this should be balanced against the 
possibility of losing evidentiary value, and protocols 
can depend on whether the device is powered on or 
off.8 
Discovery of a powered-off device  
A powered-off device should be forensically imaged 
on site or in a forensic laboratory.9 A forensic image 
                                                          
4 If possible, disable audio component because conversations or 
reactions by investigators may become an issue during trial. 
5 Marjie T. Britz, Computer Forensics and Cyber Crime: An 
Introduction (3rd edn, Prentice Hall, 2013), 317. 
6 Storage drives may be located on a wired or wireless network, thus 
a thorough search will aim to trace the physical wired network and 
search for wireless links to network storage. Furthermore, if 
available, investigators should always consider seizing any back-ups 
of the data. 
7 Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence, 30-31. 
8 Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence, 30-31. 
9 For a detailed explanation of currently available tools for “forensic 
imaging” See Peter Sommer, Digital Evidence, Digital Investigations 
and E-Disclosure: A guide to Forensic Readiness for Organisations, 
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ensures that analysts do not inadvertently alter data 
during the examination. Retaining an unaltered 
version strengthens the evidence’s probative value by 
alleviating concerns over best evidence.10 Ideally, an 
image of the entire device should be made, however, 
partial or selective file copying may be considered as 
an alternative when the amount of data to be imaged 
makes complete copies impracticable. 
As part of the forensic imaging process, the 
investigator should compare the internal clock of the 
device in its BIOS against the actual time. Often, the 
internal clock differs from the actual date and time 
causing file metadata11 to be inaccurate. Information 
regarding the difference between the internal clock 
and the actual time is useful in authentication of the 
evidence, establishing its chain of custody, and may 
aid in creating a link between the defendant and the 
evidence.12 To establish the accurate metadata time 
stamps, examiners can photograph the computer time 
in the BIOS screen next to an external clock. At this 
point the hard drive and its forensic copy should be 
brought to a secure location for examination and 
analysis. Methods to transport and store the 
equipment are discussed below. 
Discovery of a powered-on device  
A powered-on device presents special challenges. If 
the device has encryption, powering it off may cause 
volumes to automatically encrypt such that 
investigators can never recover the data.13 An 
                                                                                                  
Security Advisers and Lawyers (Information Assurance Advisory 
Counsel, v3 March 2012), 40, available at 
http://www.iaac.org.uk/_media/DigitalInvestigations2012.pdf?goback
=%2Egde_37008_member_157854004#%21 . 
10 “Best evidence” issues arise when the evidence submitted is a 
copy of an original and the original was accessible to the party 
proffering such evidence. Note that there is no concept of a digital 
‘original’, for which see George L. Paul, Foundations of Digital 
Evidence, 48; Burkhard Schaffer and Stephen Mason, ‘The 
characteristics of electronic evidence in digital format’, 2.04; Stephen 
Mason, “Electronic evidence and the meaning of ‘original’” Amicus 
Curiae The Journal of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies, Issue 
79, Autumn 2009, 26-28, available from http://sas-
space.sas.ac.uk/2565/  
11 “Metadata” is “data about data,” and includes the dates and times 
the files were viewed or altered. 
12 See Prosecutor v. Karemera and others, Case No. IT-98-44-T, 
Judgment, 169-173, 205 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Feb. 2, 2012) 
(The date and time of a video of a rally submitted as evidence 
proved that the accused was in attendance). 
13 In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 
2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. 2009) (Investigators shut down a suspect’s 
computer causing the encryption of evidence that was unrecoverable 
without the suspect’s password). 
inexperienced investigator who discovers a hard drive 
should leave it on until the appropriate personnel 
arrive to assess the situation. Once the investigator 
arrives, they have to decide whether to shut down the 
device immediately, or gather evidence prior to doing 
so. Second, whether it is more prudent to shut down 
the device by pulling the power cord or by internal 
commands. This section discusses the issues in a 
broad context. 
In assessing whether to power-down or gather 
evidence, first, investigators must weigh whether a 
digital inspection will inadvertently alter evidence and 
raise authentication issues later.14 Alternatively, some 
data may be destroyed or encrypted if the device is 
immediately shut down. Data at risk of being lost is 
stored in the Random Access Memory (RAM), which 
may contain active programs and passwords.15 
Ultimately, investigators should consider whether the 
value of the volatile data that is recoverable 
outweighs the potential risk of diminishing the 
credibility of other evidence that might be obtained. 
If an investigator decides to gather evidence prior to 
shutting down the device, then the investigator 
should consider making the evidence visible on the 
screen and photographing it. All actions taken in the 
attempt to bring the relevant information onto the 
screen should be documented. 
The recommended method for powering down the 
computer is dependent upon the operating system of 
the device. One author suggests removing the power 
cord or battery out of the device, rather than from the 
wall socket. This prevents the hard drive from 
performing shut down processes that may alter the 
                                                          
14 The general rule for mobile telephones is to block remote 
alteration by placing the telephone in a faraday bag, which is a radio 
frequency shielding cloth, or by switching it to “airplane” mode or its 
equivalent. See Eoghan Casey and Benjamin Turnbull, ‘Digital 
Evidence on Mobile Devices’ in Eoghan Casey, Digital Evidence and 
Computer Crime (3rd edn, Academic Press, 2011), available at 
http://booksite.elsevier.com/9780123742681/Chapter_20_Final.pdf ; 
Eric Katz, A Field Test of Mobile Phone Shielding Devices 8 (10 
December 2010) (Ph.D dissertation, Purdue University) available at 
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=
techmasters . However, mobile forensics is becoming more complex 
as security on mobile devices improves. New features allowing the 
user to remotely wipe data require mobile devices to be quickly 
isolated from the network to prevent the user from deleting data. On 
the other hand, by being disconnected from the network, data can be 
automatically deleted. For instance, Blackberry devices will 
automatically delete all data after being disconnected from the 
network for a certain number of days, thus requiring forensic 
analysis to occur shortly after the device is seized. 
15 Examples of “running processes” that are typically more valuable 
to investigations are, instant messaging conversations, financial 
statements, active remote data storage, or data encryption. 
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original hard drive.16 However, some operating 
systems can be damaged by an immediate power 
failure and should be shut down through the regular 
internal shut down commands. Once the device is 
shut down, it should be forensically imaged. 
Authentication  
Authentication ensures that the evidence tendered 
establishes what it is offered to prove. In this context, 
it attempts to demonstrate that the investigation has 
not altered the digital evidence. Even a slight 
difference between the forensic image and the 
original will have a deleterious affect on the 
evidence’s ultimate probative value.17 
Typically, investigators authenticate evidence 
originating from a hard drive through an electronic 
fingerprinting process. In this process, the original 
hard drive is subjected to a “checksum” of its contents 
through a mathematical process that produces a 
result unique to the specific hard drive in its current 
state. The forensic image of the hard drive is 
subjected to the same fingerprinting test, with 
identical results between the original, which is 
exposed to the test early in the process, and the 
forensic image, which is exposed at a later stage, 
indicating with a high degree of probability that the 
two are truly identical.18 
To improve the likelihood that the forensic image and 
the original hard drive are identical, investigators 
should pay attention to the transportation and 
storage of the device. As a general guideline, 
computer equipment should be stored at normal 
room temperature and free from magnetic influence 
such as radio receivers. Also dust, smoke, sand, water, 
oil, and extreme humidity are harmful to electronic 
equipment.19 Moreover, transporting digital evidence 
in the trunk or boot of a police car is not 
recommended because of high temperatures and 
                                                          
16 Robert Moore, Cybercrime: Investigating High-Technology 
Computer Crime (2 nd edn, Anderson, 2010), 215. 
17 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 19 
November 2010 (holding that minor authentication issues does not 
prohibit admission into evidence, but does affect its final probative 
value). 
18 Eoghan Casey, Digital Evidence and Computer Crime, 22-24. 
19 Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence, Appendix C. 
close proximity to other electronic communication 
equipment.20 
In all cases, investigators should exercise diligence, 
carefully log their investigative actions, and document 
how the device is connected to other equipment. The 
principal investigation should be performed on a 
forensic copy of the device, rather than the original. 
Furthermore, every step of the forensic analysis 
conducted by the investigator should be capable of 
replication. 
Evidentiary protocols for digital evidence 
recovered from a device not in the 
possession of the investigator 
Investigators sometimes obtain evidence that is 
obtained from a device that is not in the possession of 
the investigator (such as data from a website that is 
stored on a server), or its creator. This may include a 
video sent by e-mail to an investigator or stored upon 
some publicly available internet service. Typically, the 
device that captured the evidence, that is the hard 
drive or camera, does not accompany it, and in some 
situations the evidence may be sent anonymously, 
thus creating concern over its origins. With the 
increase in access to cameras and other recording 
devices, this type of evidence can be extremely useful 
in linking suspects to crimes perpetrated on large 
groups or in public view.21 
Evidence of this nature has few acquisition 
procedures because, by definition, it has already been 
either acquired by investigators or is in the public 
realm. Thus, this section switches focus to techniques 
that prove that the proffered evidence is what it 
purports to show, and thus authenticated.22 Each case 
is unique, and no universal practices can be applied to 
authenticating evidence from such sources. However, 
an understanding of traditional approaches to 
                                                          
20 Robert Moore, Cybercrime: Investigating High-Technology 
Computer Crime, 223. 
21 See Prosecutor v. Karemera and others, Case No. IT-98-44-T, 
Judgment, 169-173, 205 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Feb. 2, 2012) 
(Video evidence of rally and transcript of radio broadcast 
authenticated the date of the video and proved that the accused was 
in attendance); Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. IT-98-41-T, Trial 
Judgment and Appeals Judgment, 2029-2031, 460 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for Rwanda Dec. 8, 2008; Dec. 14, 2011) (Video footage and 
transcript led the court to conclude that the accused was acting as 
Minister of Defense and exercised control over the army). 
22 See Prosecutor v. Popovic and others, et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, 
Decision on Admissibility of Intercepted Communications, 4, 22, 26, 
33-35 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2007). 
 
Digital Evidence and Investigatory Protocols                                                                                        vvvvvvvv   
 
 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 11 (2014) | 132 
 
authentication, coupled with the creativity to go 
beyond those approaches when unusual situations 
present themselves, will increase the likelihood that 
such evidence can be used. 
This section provides a non-exhaustive list of useful 
authentication techniques for evidence not take 
directly from a device, followed by a case study in 
which an investigation attempted to authenticate a 
video brought into the public realm through private 
submission to a news agency. 
General authentication techniques  
Prosecutors and investigators often employ general 
techniques that are applicable to a wide variety of 
evidence when authenticating evidence not taken 
directly from a device. These techniques include use 
of witness testimony, internal factors such as 
metadata, and comparison with other independently 
authenticated evidence. 
If such evidence involves a personal communication, 
courts in the U.S. typically prefer it be introduced 
through testimony of an individual who was a party to 
the communication.23 This method affords the 
defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness. If the witness is not available to give 
evidence, then a written statement can still be 
beneficial for the purposes of authentication.24 For 
evidence not taken directly from a device, this 
technique usually requires the investigator to trace 
the origins of the evidence until a person can be 
identified that has knowledge of its contents or 
creation. For instance, if the evidence is a video 
available online, a request can be made to the host 
website to identify the information of the subscriber 
who uploaded it. 
Additionally, the metadata may be used to assist in its 
authentication.25 The use of metadata is helpful in 
                                                          
23 Mark L. Krotoski, “Effectively Using Electronic Evidence Before 
and at Trial”, United States Attorneys’ Bulletin Obtaining and 
Admitting Electronic Evidence, Volume 59, Number 6, (US 
Department of Justice, November 2011), 52-71, 58; available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5906.pdf.  
24 Prosecutor v. Dordevic, Decision on Prosecution’s Oral Motion for 
Admission of Evidence Tendered Through Witness Philip Coo, Case 
No. IT-05-87/1-T, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 1, 
2009) (Holding that it is desirable that digital documents be 
submitted into evidence via oral testimony, but not required because 
the court will take this into account when determining probative 
value). 
25 Lorraine v. Markel, 241 F.R.D. 534, 560 (D. Md. 2007) (stating that 
metadata can be a useful tool in authenticating digital evidence). 
many ways, but in the authentication context it is 
capable of tracing the origins of the evidence to a 
party who can testify to its accuracy. Finally, if such 
evidence is similar enough to other independently 
authenticated evidence, the courts may determine 
that the evidence is also authenticated based on its 
similarities.26 
Sri Lanka case study27  
Often authentication is not suited for evidence not 
taken directly from a device; therefore, an 
investigator must use unconventional methods. The 
following case study describes one such situation that 
called for creative approaches to the authentication of 
the evidence. 
In August of 2009, during the Sri Lankan army’s battle 
against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, video 
footage purporting to show the execution of prisoners 
became public through the submission from a private 
source to a news agency.28 No witnesses were willing 
to verify the video, nor was there any ancillary 
evidence to corroborate the video’s authenticity. 
Furthermore, the Sri Lankan Government denied the 
allegations and labeled the video unreliable.29 
Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
suspected that the video had evidentiary value and 
therefore sought to determine whether the video was 
authentic. Additionally, he set out to determine the 
reliability of the evidence, in that it depicted what it 
purported to show. To prove that the video was 
authentic, Alston sent the footage to a digital editing 
forensic expert. The expert used software (called 
“Cognitech”) to stabilize and enlarge vital parts of the 
                                                          
26 In the U.S context, see United States v. Safavian, 435 F.Supp.2d 
36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that e-mail exchanges where 
authenticated based on their similarity to other previously 
authenticated e-mails between the same individuals); in the context 
of England and Wales, see R v Mawji (Rizwan) [2003] EWCA Crim 
3067, [2003] All ER (D) 285 (Oct), discussed in Stephen Mason, 
Electronic Evidence, chapter 4. 
27 This section is predominantly compiled from Deeming Sri Lanka 
Execution Video Authentic, UN Expert Calls for War Crimes Probe, 
UN News Centre, 7 January 2010, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33423 . 
28 The video can be viewed at 
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=0a1_1311145191 . 
29 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United 
Nations, UN Expert Concludes that Sri Lankan Video is Authentic, 
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footage. He concluded that there were no breaks in 
the film’s continuity, indicating that the footage had 
not been edited or manipulated. 
Alston subsequently sent the stabilized and enlarged 
footage to two other experts, a ballistic expert and a 
forensic pathologist. The ballistic expert sought to 
determine whether the weapons and bullets shot 
during the video were real. He concluded that the 
weapons in the video were AK-47s and thus 
conducted experiments by shooting live and imitation 
AK-47 ammunition. After comparing the tapes with 
the original video, he concluded that the recoil, the 
movement of the weapon and shooter, and the gasses 
emitted from the muzzle were consistent with the 
firing of live ammunition rather than blanks. The 
forensic pathologist analyzed the victims’ body 
reactions and blood splatter from the video, and 
determined that both were consistent with “what 
would be expected” in a close range shooting.30 
While none of the experts’ findings independently 
proved beyond all doubt that the video was authentic, 
working in conjunction, they serve as compelling 
evidence of the authenticity of the video. Upon 
publishing these findings, the international 
community put pressure on the Sri Lankan 
Government to address the situation. In addition, 
Christof Heyns, a U.N. special rapporteur, stated at a 
press conference that the case should go to the next 
level of international investigation.31 The results of the 
official investigation are pending at the time of 
writing. 
The methods outlined above shed sufficient light upon 
the accuracy of the video to warrant an official 
investigation. If resources permit, then similar 
techniques should be employed to aid in the 
authentication for other evidence of a similar nature. 
Furthermore, the reliance upon a wide array of 
experts suggests that it is advantageous for an 
investigative body such as the OTP to pursue and 
maintain a large network of diverse experts. 
For evidence that is recovered independently of a 
device or from some anonymous source, investigators 
                                                          
30 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United 
Nations, UN Expert Concludes that Sri Lankan Video is Authentic, 
Calls for an Independent War Crimes Investigation. 
31 United Nations News Centre, United Nations, Sri Lanka: UN 
Experts Calls on Government to Probe Executions Captured on 
Video, (31 May 2011), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38564#.UkyDJLyT
aFM . 
must proceed on a case-by-case basis. Investigators 
dealing with such evidence may be able to employ 
traditional authentication techniques, but at times are 
required to develop creative strategies similar to 
those depicted in the Sri Lanka case study. 
Evidentiary protocols for digital evidence 
stored with service providers 
Acquisition and preservation  
Often a private-sector provider of communications or 
other services holds relevant information to an 
investigation. When seeking this data, U.S. law 
enforcement officials may make a direct request to a 
service provider to acquire the user data. 
International law enforcement must make requests 
through either a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
process or through letters rogatory. Furthermore, 
international law enforcement may be able to use the 
Joint Investigation Team (“JIT”) process. These are 
discussed below. 
Major service providers publish guides for 
investigators on how to request data, but as a first 
matter, it is important to identify the correct service 
provider to contact. This can be confusing, because 
even the unsophisticated can mask their internet 
protocol (IP) address or disguise the provenance of an 
e-mail. Investigators often begin an inquiry by 
examining available IP addresses of suspects. 
Investigators can run certain commands to try to 
reverse-trace the owner of an IP address. Similarly, e-
mail headers can be carefully inspected to determine 
its route and origin. 
The position in the United States  
In the United States, the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”) regulates access to stored electronic records, 
and this law limits government requests for user data. 
The SCA is a complex statute and this discussion aims 
to introduce the main contours of the Act. The SCA is 
section II of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (“ECPA”) and is codified at 18 U.S.C. 121 §§ 2701-
2712. It addresses voluntary and compelled disclosure 
of stored wire and electronic communications.32 The 
SCA is silent on applications for data made by foreign 
law enforcement officials, but it suggests that any 
domestic law enforcement personnel can make a 
request. 
                                                          
32 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 121 §§ 2701-2712 (1986). 
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The status of the service provider is a significant 
determinant of legal protection for user data. If the 
service provider is a private provider, then it is exempt 
from many of the SCA obligations and therefore can 
voluntarily disclose non-content and content data to 
any person for any reason. If the service provider 
serves the public, then it is subject to the SCA and 
must comply with its rules that generally prohibit the 
disclosure of content. To determine the classification 
of a service provider as public or private, a prosecutor 
must consider whether the service provider affords 
service to the community at large.33 A company that 
administers e-mail only for its employees is probably a 
private provider; whereas Google, Yahoo, or Microsoft 
mail are public providers. 
There are two types of data categories: non-content 
and content data. Non-content data includes 
subscriber and traffic data; subscriber data34 focuses 
on who owns the account whereas traffic data35 
focuses on who sent or received an e-mail. Content 
data includes the substance of an e-mail or telephone 
call such as subject lines or text in the body of an e-
mail. As a general framework, subscriber data 
requires a subpoena that shows the request is 
relevant to an ongoing investigation; traffic non-
content data requires a 2703(d) order which states 
“specific and articulable facts” linking the data request 
to an ongoing investigation; and content data such as 
e-mail content requires a 2703(c)(1) warrant.36 
Importantly, a preservation request can be made 
under 2703(f) pending the court order.37 For a 2703(f) 
request, a government entity need only send a 
request by facsimile transmission to the service 
provider to preserve all data in relation to the 
investigation. Finally, if a statutory exception applies, 
then public service providers may voluntarily disclose 
                                                          
33 US Department of Justice, Executive Office for United States 
Attorneys, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining 
Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations, 135. 
34 Subscriber data: the name and address associated with the 
account; usernames or screen names; session times and duration; 
IP addresses; means and source of payment; local and long 
distance telephone toll billing records; telephone number and type of 
service provided; and a temporarily assigned network address. 
35 Traffic data: Data that is not basic subscriber information or 
content specific. Some examples include log files, IP logs, and 
identities of e-mail correspondents. 
36 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 121 §§ 2702-2703. 
37 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 121 §§ 2703(f). 
non-content and content data to the government.38 
For example, if exigent circumstances exist such as a 
kidnapping, then the government’s request will fall 
within the statutory exemption.39 
Authentication and chain of custody 
Authentication refers to a legal concept that promotes 
the integrity of the trial process by ensuring tendered 
evidence establishes what it is offered to prove.40 To 
ensure chain of custody and thus the admissibility of 
the service provider data, the recipient of the data 
should date the creation of the document, write the 
name of the client or individual being served, describe 
the evidence being held, describe the reason for the 
transfer from point A to point B, complete a list of 
each person who had physical control over the 
evidence, and provide appropriate space for 
individuals to sign when they receive and release the 
evidence.41 
Procedure on how to request service provider data  
Some major service providers such as Google and 
Facebook have corporate forms that require all data 
requests to be executed in the U.S.42 To ensure 
investigators do not duplicate efforts and to assist in 
later stages of the legal process, investigators may 
consider completing a data acquisition request form 
for internal planning of the request from the service 
                                                          
38 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 121 §§ 2703(f). 
39 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 121 §§ 2702(5). 
40 See Prosecutor v. Popovic and others, Case No. IT-05-88-T, 
Decision on Admissibility of Intercepted Communications in Trial 
Chamber II, 4, 22, 26, 33-35 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2007). 
41 Erik Laykin, Investigative Computer Forensics: The Practical 
Guide for Lawyers, Accountants, Investigators, and Business 
Executives (Wiley, 2013), 76-69, 83-85; Eoghan Casey, Digital 
Evidence and Computer Crime, 21-22; Good Practice Guide for 
Digital Evidence, 6.7.1. 
42 However, the Belgian police have challenged this requirement, 
requiring an ISP to provide data direct to the Belgian authorities 
when requested, for which see the translations of the various 
decisions in the Yahoo! case in Belgium (citations refer to the Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review) with commentaries 
written by Johan Vandendriessche: Corr. Dendermonde 2 maart 
2009, onuitg. (Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg te Dendermonde (The 
Court of First Instance in Dendermonde)), 8 (2011) 196 – 207; Gent 
30 juni 2010, onuitg. (Hof van Beroep (The Court of Appeal in Ghent, 
third chamber, sitting in criminal matters)), 8 (2011) 208 – 215; Cass. 
18 januari 2011, nr. P.10.1347.N (Hof van Cassatie (Court of 
Cassation of Belgium)), 8 (2011) 216 – 218; Brussel 12 oktober 
2011, onuitg, Hof van Beroep te Brussel (The Court of Appeal in 
Brussels, thirteenth chamber, sitting in criminal matters), 9 (2012) 
102 – 105; P. 11.1906.N/1 Hof van Cassatie – Cour de cassation 
(Court of Cassation of Belgium) (4 September 2012), 10 (2013) 155 
– 157. 
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provider.43 The request form should identify the 
evidence being sought; methodological information; 
the date and time of the acquisition; the individual 
who collected the data; whether it was from a 
physical device or not; the location, and any other 
reasonable information.44 Furthermore, many service 
providers publish a guide for law enforcement 
investigators with forms for data requests and specific 
information about procedures. Comcast is one of 
many service providers that provide step-by-step data 
acquisition guidelines as outlined below.45 
First, the requestor should verify that the IP address 
or e-mail address is registered to the service provider 
by using the reverse-trace mechanism. Second, the 
requestor should determine whether the data sought 
is subscriber, traffic, or content data and therefore 
whether it implicates a subpoena, 2703(d) order, or a 
2703(c)(1) warrant respectively. Third, the requestors’ 
inquiry should include the IP address, e-mail address, 
street address, telephone number and all other 
pertinent information that would allow the service 
provider to adequately respond. Fourth, the requestor 
should include the date and time of all incidents 
including seconds and time zone, i.e. 12 December 
2007 @ 06:13:21 EST. Requestors should caution time 
synchronization stamps because if preserved 
inaccurately, then issues arise.46 Fifth, the requestor 
should ensure that the required certifications and all 
applicable substantive and procedural requirements 
under the particular statutes or regulation authorizing 
the request have been satisfied. Sixth, the requestor 
should ensure that there is a complete explanation of 
the nature and circumstances of any potential serious 
injury or death to justify an emergency disclosure. 
Lastly, the requestor should ensure that all of the 
contact information is correct. 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Joint 
Investigation Teams  
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and letters rogatory 
allow international evidence exchanges in criminal 
                                                          
43 Erik Laykin, Investigative Computer Forensics, 78-79.  
44 Erik Laykin, Investigative Computer Forensics, 78-79. 
45 Comcast, Law Enforcement Guide, http://cryptome.org/isp-
spy/comcast-spy.pdf . 
46 Interview with Chris Hoofnagle, Director, Information Privacy 
Programs, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology (1 October 2013). 
procedures.47 The MLAT process is initiated when a 
treaty facilitating the evidence exchange exists and 
the letters rogatory process is used when a treaty 
does not exist to facilitate the exchange between 
courts. MLATs are negotiated by the Department of 
State in cooperation with the Department of Justice. 
Google is one service provider that specifies a MLAT 
framework as well as other diplomatic arrangements 
to assist foreign entities in their data requests.48 
Google states that non-U.S. agencies can work 
through the U.S. Department of Justice to gather 
evidence for legitimate investigations. Furthermore if 
United States law is implicated in the investigation, 
then “a U.S. agency may open its own investigation 
and provide non-U.S. investigators with evidence 
gathered.” Google may provide data on a voluntary 
basis if the request is consistent with international 
norms, U.S. law, and the law of the requesting 
country. Given that an international agency goes 
through a diplomatic process, like MLAT, Google will 
divulge the same information to a non-U.S. agency, as 
it would produce if the request originated directly 
from a U.S. agency. The MLAT process takes 
significantly more time than that experienced by 
domestic law enforcement requesting data through 
the SCA. 
Joint Investigation Teams (“JITs”) are a response to 
the 21st century criminal landscape, which consists of 
highly mobile groups engaged in illegal activity across 
borders.49 This trend demands strengthened 
transnational cooperation between competent 
authorities.50 A JIT is an investigation team established 
for a specified time period, based on an agreement 
between two or more European Union member states 
and competent authorities. If all parties are in 
                                                          
47 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report (7 March 2012) (It is unclear whether and how the OTP can 
use the MLAT or letters rogatory processes. Furthermore, it is 
ambiguous whether parties to the Rome Statute should initiate the 
MLAT or letters rogatory processes). 
48 Google, Transparency Report, not dated, available at 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/legalpr
ocess/#how_does_google_respond . 
49 European Commission: Joint Investigation Teams, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/police-
cooperation/jit/index_en.htm . 
50 European Commission: Joint Investigation Teams, (It is unclear 
whether “authorities” means states or may include international 
criminal tribunals). 
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agreement, then other states may participate in a 
JIT.51 
Conclusion 
This brief paper has set forth strategies to acquire and 
authenticate digital evidence in a forensically valid 
manner. Careful cyber investigations can strengthen 
the prosecutions’ case as well as provide 
corroborating evidence connecting the accused to the 
alleged crime. The acquisition of digital evidence is 
fundamental in all investigations within a modern law 
enforcement environment. The collection of digital 
evidence is the “rule rather than the exception” in 
current investigations.52 Two fundamental themes 
dominate each procedure: First, the objective of 
acquisition is to obtain an exact replica of the data to 
ensure validity and thus the highest probative value. 
Second, authenticity is critical and is attainable 
through corroboration or other means. It is suggested 
three further points of discussion are warranted. First, 
the nature of the investment in training and 
equipment that is necessary to enhance evidence 
gathering in a forensically valid way as well as increase 
the probative value of the evidence. Second, given the 
burdens of the MLAT and letters rogatory processes, it 
is to be considered whether the ICC should seek U.S. 
provider data on European servers, or via the JIT 
process. Third, the ICC may wish to consider the issue 
of novel scientific evidence, and whether a formal 
protocol is worth be considering in the future. 
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51 Europol, Joint Investigation Teams, 2013, available at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/joint-investigation-
teams-989 . 
52 International Criminal Court, Digital Evidence Report, October 
2013. This is an internal document circulated only within the ICC and 
the Human Rights Center at Berkeley. 
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